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  <title>Cascade Risk Review</title>
  <subtitle>Real incidents examined through propagation, amplification, barriers and containment.</subtitle>
  <id>https://risksinsync.com/review/</id>
  <link href="https://risksinsync.com/review/" />
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  <updated>2026-09-29T00:00:00Z</updated>
  <author><name>Jose Luis Sanz</name><uri>https://risksinsync.com/about/</uri></author>
  <entry>
    <title>When power returns before water does</title>
    <id>https://risksinsync.com/review/year-1-nr-4/</id>
    <link href="https://risksinsync.com/review/year-1-nr-4/" />
    <published>2026-09-29T00:00:00Z</published>
    <updated>2026-09-29T00:00:00Z</updated>
    <author><name>Jose Luis Sanz</name></author>
    <summary>A power dip halted pumping at Rand Water sites (South Africa). Electricity returned in under two hours; the water system required more time to recover.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>A safety system stopped Dutch trains — and spread the disruption</title>
    <id>https://risksinsync.com/review/year-1-nr-3/</id>
    <link href="https://risksinsync.com/review/year-1-nr-3/" />
    <link href="https://risksinsync.com/review/year-1-nr-3/assets/conformity_bias.jpeg" rel="enclosure" />
    <published>2026-09-22T00:00:00Z</published>
    <updated>2026-09-22T00:00:00Z</updated>
    <author><name>Jose Luis Sanz</name></author>
    <summary>The Dutch rail disruption shows how a safety response can contain immediate physical danger while redistributing disruption across a tightly connected transport system.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>When one storm becomes an island-wide restoration problem</title>
    <id>https://risksinsync.com/review/year-1-nr-2/</id>
    <link href="https://risksinsync.com/review/year-1-nr-2/" />
    <published>2026-09-15T00:00:00Z</published>
    <updated>2026-09-15T00:00:00Z</updated>
    <author><name>Jose Luis Sanz</name></author>
    <summary>Hurricane Lowell shows why recovery is not just a sequence of repairs: blocked access and shared transmission assets can turn local damage into a multi-system coordination problem.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>A 3 GW shock hit the German power system. Most people noticed nothing.</title>
    <id>https://risksinsync.com/review/year-1-nr-1/</id>
    <link href="https://risksinsync.com/review/year-1-nr-1/" />
    <published>2026-09-08T00:00:00Z</published>
    <updated>2026-09-08T00:00:00Z</updated>
    <author><name>Jose Luis Sanz</name></author>
    <summary>Five large generating units suddenly disconnected from the German grid after suspected sabotage. Around 3 GW of live production disappeared—yet the wider electricity supply remained stable.</summary>
  </entry>
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